Roundtable Regroup – Banks, Casinos, and Comedians

 KEY TAKEAWAYS:

• There may be ripple effects that occur throughout small and medium-sized businesses due to recent regional bank issues.  
• We believe rising cost of capital will continue to create long and variable lags in the market.  Being judicious when looking at new ideas is critical.
• There are lots of different approaches to investing in the same way, there are lots of different methods to make people laugh. Being true to one’s process is essential.
• Equal-Weight Approach – having a limited number of securities makes each name high-conviction and may help reduce risk.

    

 

 

Kyle Helton:

Hello and welcome to the latest edition of the QPD Podcast. I’m your host, Kyle Helton, Senior Vice President and Western Regional Director for Cambiar Investors. Over the last month, Cambiar has participated in a variety of institutional and RIA focused conferences across the country. During these meetings, we’ve encountered a lot of great questions as it pertains to our smaller cap strategies, regional banks and new investment ideas that fit our QPD process. So on this show, I thought it would be great to bring back Cambiar SMID and Small Cap portfolio managers, as well as invite Cambiar’s Director of Institutional Sales, Kevin Fitzpatrick. Fresh off these conference meetings, I have them joining me in studio for a round table regroup session to go through some of the more popular topics. Gentlemen, welcome to the show.

Portfolio Manager:

Thanks, Kyle. Great to see you.

Colin Dunn:

Hey Kyle, good to be here.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Hey Kyle, thanks for having me.

Kyle Helton:

To get things started. A lot has already been made in the news about the demise of a few regional banks. However, Colin, during our recent travels together, you discussed an interesting point about some of the regional names and how certain unique and enviable characteristics of their businesses turned into massive risk characteristics overnight and the impact to many active managers. Can you explain?

Colin Dunn:

Historically I think active investors would’ve been biased towards these differentiated institutions to the ones that failed over the last several months have been high on the active manager list of preference because they appeared to have a differentiated business model that stood out in a very homogenized industry. So maybe the profits of the industry were not growing that fast. This is regional banking, but a select few institutions could grow above that average rate because they were competing against less interesting peers or less good peers. And I think the way to approach it going forward is to consider in addition to that differentiated business model, the culture of the institution. They are institutions where taking risk is part of the business. And so if you don’t have a mindset at the company for risk management, you can get into a lot of trouble.

First Republic and SVB did not necessarily fail because they had to pay more for deposits. They failed, they took a tremendous amount of risk on the asset side of their balance sheet. They didn’t think they took any credit risk, they took interest rate risk and the failure to appreciate what should have been banking 101 is a major cultural failure from a risk management perspective. And there are institutions in the 4,700 regional banks that have a culture of managing risk very well and being very countercyclical with their capital deployment. What that means is when risk premiums are very low, they don’t do a lot, they don’t deploy a lot of capital into lending or M&A. They wait around knowing that every 7, 10, 15 years the industry hits a roadblock and they have excess capital in balance sheet flexibility to pounce upon those situations. You saw that with JP Morgan here over the last few weeks and their ability to acquire First Republic they took very little risk in their own securities portfolio.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

So related question, a lot of these regional banks provide the lending and credit lines, which is essentially the oxygen that small business relies upon to maintain their day-to-day and these companies oftentimes don’t tap into the larger banks. So to what extent could you see the issues impacting small regional banks to have a ripple effect on the business climate within small cap companies?

Portfolio Manager:

Yeah, a lot of small to medium-sized businesses are reliant on banks as a source of funding and similarly, those banks are reliant on small and medium-sized businesses through which to take well protected risk and ultimately derive return for themselves and their equity holders. And so one of the things that is relevant to those two generic points is that our focus here at Cambiar has long been on companies that do have attributes that help them weather points or errors in time where credit availability is potentially limited or when the cost of credit is in fact higher. And so these are companies with strong margin profiles, histories of consistent free cash flow and balance sheets and working capital setups that don’t require day-to-day access to credit when it’s either not available or too expensive. And so sure there’s likely to be certain ripple effects through all kinds of businesses. Given those credit dynamics, our expectation would be where we have our clients exposed that should not only be less of an issue but potentially an area to capitalize on in terms of taking market share, in terms of being to act strategically when competitors aren’t.

Kyle Helton:

Yeah. And in January we were talking a lot about the emergence of a cost of capital and liquidity as key risks in the marketplace that you saw. While those may continue to persist, are there new areas of risks that you have identified that people should be thinking about that maybe aren’t right now?

Colin Dunn:

Well, I don’t know that there’s anything new. I think what we’re mindful of is again, we try not to harp too much on macro, we try to focus more on the stocks, but this idea of long and variable lags of this higher cost of capital, the impact of tighter lending standards at regional banks, and that is an example of long and variable lags. You raise rates and it causes changes in behavior. And one of the changes of behavior from a fourth order here was that deposits moved away from banks. Capital became more scarce at the bank, so they had to be more choosy about what loans they made.

Certainly they can recognize that credit is probably going to get worse, which means they apply a higher risk premium to the loans they make. And so that is in effect what we are observing is one needs to be patient and let this unfold. Higher rates have been a phenomenon now for 15 months or so or higher than zero, and so we’re mindful of the fact that it takes a while to figure out where the issues are going to crop up. And so to continue to be judicious as we pursue new ideas, be mindful of areas where not being a self funder is still a problem and likely to be for some period of time.

Portfolio Manager:

Yeah. We’re certainly mindful of the way history tends to rhyme. And so as we’re looking at what seems to be a well forecast recession here in an area like commercial real estate, which at this point is certainly an area of consensus bearishness, we’re trying to think holistically about a space like that where a lot of the analysis you’re seeing is referencing previous recessions, previous downturns, whether those have been macroeconomic in nature, whether those have been real estate specific and allaying some assumptions around, well, where do cap rates tend to bottom? Where do loan to values and recoveries tend to bottom in commercial real estate asset areas? And it’s all interesting analysis and it’s quite possible that this cycle will look like many previous cycles in that space.

However, one thing that seems to be less trafficked in, in terms of what is the potential difference in the context of rhyming is how different occupancies are at the beginning of this cycle relative to previous cycles where you’ve had arguably a secular shift in terms of just what occupancy and vacancy rates do in fact look like in major metro centers. So previous cycles haven’t started with occupancy levels on the order of 40 to 50% like they are in metro areas like say Chicago or San Francisco or New York. And so sure this is a down cycle and sure naturally there will be an upcycle out of this, but the scale of the losses, the timing of the losses, the concept of long and variable lag in concert with the secular change in the space are things that are very difficult to quantify. But Colin and I remain suspicious that it’s all been discounted this early in the playout.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, I think you also, along with that, we read a lot about folks discounting the risk of commercial real estate because it’s only X big of an asset class versus other larger asset classes, and I think that’s fine and understandable if it existed in a vacuum, but the cost of capital has gone up everywhere, and so while one place might be the epicenter, there’s likely to be a bunch of places that experience some pain. And so when you have to all of a sudden start dealing with multiple problem areas at once, any individual problem area becomes less manageable, so in isolation all these things look like they can be managed, when you start accruing the pile-up of things that could go wrong, it becomes more problematic.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

So with the understanding that you do not want to let the macro overly drive the buy/sell decision at a company level, to what extent do some of these variables such as monetary policy and recession, inflation, hard landing, soft landing influence the process at all?

Portfolio Manager:

Yeah, it’d be pretty naive for us to either do or suggest that the macro doesn’t factor into the bottom-up stock analysis. I think where it’s most central to the work product is around how those macro variables translate into supply dynamics at a micro level for the businesses that we’re evaluating. So I follow the industrial space as an example, and a number of the companies where we’ve been exposed over the last several years and continue to be are companies that are positioned in an advantageous manner in a secular sense. So companies that over indexed areas like electrification to areas like labor cost relief in the form of automation as a couple of tangible examples.

And so in evaluating those companies, it would be impossible to have a view on specifically what revenue trends might look like or specifically what margin trends might look like without considering what’s happening in terms of what their customers are able to do, in terms of afford the product they might be selling, in terms of getting approval for a large CAPEX project that might need a good bit of the product or service that a company like Hubble might supply. And so it can’t all be done in a vacuum. I think it’s more a thought around not letting an overt macro view skew sector exposure in a top-down context that might move us away from trying to build these portfolios quality company by quality company versus trying to play a specific market trend over a shorter period of time.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, it’s really about predicting a specific outcome from a macro perspective and building the portfolio around that outcome. You want to own good companies for a variety of reasons, but part of that is they have an ability to navigate varying environments better than a mediocre or below-average company. So knowing our difficulty we have in calling the macro, it’s more about owning businesses that can navigate multiple outcomes, having a balanced portfolio that’s not too beholden to any particular outcome, but when it comes to what we do care about with macro, it’s critical to be macro aware. So if unemployment is currently 3.4%, what’s it more likely to do over the next 12 to 18 months, go to 4% or go to 3%? Recognizing that over the course of history, 3.4% is very low, the next big move is probably more worsening in unemployment than it is to further better it, which might inform your incremental stock selection relative to what you already own, being mindful of a company potentially over earning if they benefit from tight employment.

Portfolio Manager:

And we want to own a portfolio on behalf of our clients that can offer alpha in either of those situations. So if employment goes to 4%, that’s certainly one outcome. If it drops further to 3%, that’s another outcome and the concept is to have a wide array of value drivers across the portfolio that can work in any number of different macro environments. But the other element of that too is to in down equity markets offer downside capture, in up in revaluing equity markets, be able to capture that upside for our clients as well with both of those dynamics up capture and down capture being critical to compounding long-term returns in excess of the index, which is what we’re looking to do over cycles.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

All right. Let’s shift gears for a second and talk about a given individual sector within the portfolio. I was looking at consumer discretionary for instance. The consumer as everyone knows, has been extremely resilient with people continuing to spend, whether it’s on flights, on restaurants, vacations, services, you name it. Yet some of the holdings in our portfolio don’t seem to be on the front lines from a consumption standpoint. So I guess I’m curious to what extent do the investment thesis for our discretionary names depend on the continued strength of the consumer in this environment.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah. When people think consumer discretionary the sector, I think they’re constantly thinking what you would find in a shopping mall across the street, and that’s definitely a component of what’s in there, but you have the home building industry is almost entirely in the consumer discretionary sector, so you have auto is mostly reside, so auto dealers and certain auto parts providers even. And then you as well have the apparel companies and the goods companies and you have travel and leisure, so there’s a lot of different things within there. And so we have tried to find the more differentiated businesses and the better business models and to your point, we don’t cover all those bases because there’s not always quality companies at quality prices to attach to in those areas or differentiated companies.

Back to the conversation on regional banks, your nth apparel provider at the mall that I just mentioned is not always special enough to warrant inclusion in what we would call a quality business categorization. So we try to attach ourselves to areas that have better medium-term value drivers around where the consumer is going to spend money, has some moats around its business that lends themselves to more durable margins, returns on invested capital, free cash flow, and also less leverage. There’s a lot of companies in there that carry a lot of leverage.

Portfolio Manager:

The specific exposures we have in the consumer stack and Small Cap would include a regional gaming company which not only is seeing increased spend and consumption, again back to that services over goods dynamic in terms of how consumers are allaying their discretionary budget, but moreover, this is a special and differentiated business because unlike a lot of hotel, gaming and leisure operators, this is a company that’s in fact net cash and so has the ability to weather whatever the forward macro environment pretends whilst enjoying a fairly robust consumer spending dynamic at the moment. Those excess cash flows are going into corporate coffers or back to the minority equity holders in the form of special dividend. In the case of this entity where we’re involved.

Kyle Helton:

With inflation being persistently high, albeit coming down, many are talking about an impending recession. Your allocation to Monarch Gaming, a regional gaming company has caught many eyes and seems counterintuitive. What about that business has allowed it to be flow positive relative to peers that haven’t been able to accomplish that feat? What unique attributes of this business has got it here?

Portfolio Manager:

Yeah, well sure. Not being inside these companies, we hesitate to be too opinionated on specifically what it is they’re able to do to deliver the results that they have, but this has historically been a business that has consistently generated cash through varying points of the cycles and it’s not as if they haven’t used capital or taken on leverage to build additional facilities, but to date have been very conscientious about getting that CAPEX via debt paid down quickly. And so that gives them the flexibility to pull levers like flexibility on how they might choose to price their rooms as an example, not being desperate for occupancy, which over the long run can help build competitive differentiation, can help build and sustain a margin profile and exactly how or why that is, is less relevant to the fact that it is and has been so historically, which we would so far expect to continue moving forward.

Colin Dunn:

We’ve talked about a few areas where we are currently invested over the course of this conversation and I think that we find ourselves consistently thinking about whether it’s as we do our work here and are aware of what other people outside of Cambiar are thinking or we’re at conferences and find ourselves either sitting in an empty room or sitting in a full room and wondering why everybody’s in there is we think of ourselves as playing in space. I think for anybody who’s listening has coached youth sports at one point or another, particularly youth soccer, I have an eight-year-old and recently upgraded 11 year old, they’ve played youth soccer and one of the funny things that I think anybody who’s watched that can observe is how everybody moves to where the ball is. So if there’s 14 kids in the field, one kid in each goal, you have 12 kids within three feet of where the ball is and that doesn’t lend itself to great execution.

If you can ever teach these kids to stay in the space or the part of the field that’s open and then good things can happen, and so if you have a left midfielder and the ball’s on the right tell that left midfielder patrol up and down the left side of the field and if they have the patience to hang out there, sooner or later the ball might pop out right in front of the goal and they have an easy goal to score. And we think of investing somewhat similarly in terms of playing in space. There’s multiple ways to do that. There’s looking where other people aren’t looking a little bit of that as a contrarian idea, a little bit of that if other people aren’t looking at it, there’s a sense that it might be inexpensive and the margin of safety might be higher than a place where everybody else is looking, which might embed much higher expectations.

There’s also this concept that we try to be consistent employers of our discipline, so buying good companies at a price that doesn’t embed high expectations. And so at times that’s going to set us apart from where a lot of the other folks are. I think 2021 when there wasn’t a lot of discipline being expressed by a lot of investor choices. And so that left us feeling a little bit lonely, looking for boring companies at boring prices versus a lot of the hot stuff going on. And so playing in space in that case was continuing to do what we thought was the best thing for our clients to deliver good total returns over rolling three and five year periods, while also maintaining the ability for the portfolio to have good downside capture when times of stress came, like now. I think folks have talked about buying insurance, you need to do so before you actually need it and making good decisions in 2021 by playing in space versus being where the crowd was, was a way to buy insurance back then that allowed you to outperform in 2022. And so far in 2023.

Kyle Helton:

And maybe taking a step back, how did we get to this investment philosophy? You have both multiple times mentioned being humble in the sense that there’s a lot of different ways to make money in the marketplace. I think of it like standup comedy. There’s a lot of different ways to get laughes. You look at Dave Chappelle and Jerry Seinfeld and do they do the same job? Maybe it’s hard to say, how did we come to this philosophy?

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, embedded in something we find ourselves saying a lot is we understand and there are lots of different ways to invest in the same way, there’s lots of different ways to make people laugh and we’re okay with that. I can’t build a quant model that’ll deliver returns for folks. I don’t have maybe the stomach to sit there and trade stocks day in and day out, some big value creators have in other areas, but this is a way that works for me and my personality and I think it has proven itself to work for others over time where you can deliver good total returns with good downside capture. And so this is something that resonates with me and I think to be something you’re not is probably not the path to success. You have to find something that works for you. And I think this works for me and I think Andy has just said that it works for him and the rest of our team.

Portfolio Manager:

I mean George Carlin was famous for ripping up his act at the start of any given calendar year and starting a new, and to him that was a way to consistently attract and entertain an audience. For us, there’s a real value conversely in consistency, in not trying so hard to consistently appeal to an audience that always needs something new and always needs something different. It’s consistency and to some degree simplicity that has proven it works over long arcs in the capital markets and that’s the bar we’re aiming toward.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Now the point about sticking to your guns in this environment is so telling because you’ve had so many managers over the past year or two, you’re seeing wide dispersion on a performance basis within managers that all seem to, at least on paper practice a similar philosophy. So that leads you to one of two conclusions. Either the implementation has been less than stellar for some managers versus others, or they shifted into names that don’t meet their criteria. 

Portfolio Manager:

I guess it’s the persistence of the attributes that’s important. Evaluating and doing the diligence on what these strategies have represented over long arcs flushes out that things like return on asset, return on equity, return on invested capital, profitability, exposure to businesses with substantially lower leverage than the index, those are not new features of these strategies. Those are persistent attributes that have been in place for many, many, many years and will as well in a forward context.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Well, and then you layer on with that just patience because these are small caps for a reason and the markets inevitably will provide an opportunity for you to attach these businesses. You don’t have to reach for price on some of these names.

Portfolio Manager:

Yeah. Those are certainly relevant points and certainly Buffett in his annual meeting being in the news, a lot of his rhetoric gets refreshed. And among his golden rules are two that are certainly tangible for us, which is never sacrifice on quality and most news is noise. And that’s part of the trick is evaluating when noise is in fact news, but that is the reality. Names bounce around, trends bounce around. It’s really looking to get attached to businesses where through it all their own attributes represent unbelievable level of consistency. And if you can get attached to those companies at the right price, that’s the bet we’re making on behalf of our clients.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Maybe the one thing I guess from my perspective that we get a lot is what’s somewhat unique on your portfolio construction is a decision to use an equal-weighted approach at an individual stock level. So every name on small cap goes in at 2% every name in SMID goes in at two and a half percent. Can you comment on that, why you choose that versus maybe some conviction-weighted sizing methodology.

Portfolio Manager:

Well, they are all conviction weighted and that’s part of the idea is each name is going in as a high-conviction idea from the sponsoring analyst. I think as portfolio managers, that’s actually one of the challenges is delineating levels of conviction amongst an analyst. And we’ve quite frankly found that we’re not particularly good at handicapping that for a number of reasons. And so again, as an ascension to humility, it’s our view that, look, we just quite frankly don’t know what’s going to work and when. And since each name does represent a high degree of bottom up fundamental research with associated high conviction of the analyst, we just as soon give each name an equal opportunity to outperform in the context of the overall portfolio.

Colin Dunn:

Again, back to our investment philosophy versus others, this is an area where we certainly appreciate that others might have an ability to conviction weight their positions that would lead to non-uniform position size at entry. For us, this works, it also simplifies decision-making. We either like the stock and think it’s helpful to the portfolio or you don’t really like the stock and relative to 39 other ideas in our SMID portfolio, and you don’t want to include it in the portfolio. Analysts have to make a lot of decisions that are subjective in nature. And so removing one piece of subjectivity from our perspective helps get to the heart of the matter, which should this be in the portfolio or should it not? So we find that to be helpful. It’s also a source of risk control. We are humble again about the idea that in picking stocks you make mistakes and it happens a lot.

I think a good batting average somewhere around 600, I think we’ve talked about that on these podcasts in the past and we’re appreciative of that. And by limiting how much capital you will commit to an individual idea, you are protecting yourself on the margin from the inevitable mistake. So we will put in our SMID portfolio a new position in at two and a half percent if it goes down and we still like the position, commit additional capital, one more time back up to that two and a half percent, but we won’t do it again. And part of that is recognizing that sometimes the market always had it right and we were wrong, and we want to limit the ability of that single idea to infect the results of the overall portfolio. Overall, we’re delivering a portfolio to clients, and we mentioned before a key job for the portfolio managers is to manage risk and the equal position sizing is part of managing risk from our perspective.

Kyle Helton:

And it goes back to this concept of investing over long arcs. You’re trying to optimize returns over rolling three and five year periods instead of maximizing returns in 90 to 120 day windows.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

And the reality is, I think based on the indices that you’re benched against, a 2% position is a fairly active bet versus a lot of these businesses.

Colin Dunn:

That’s a good point. I mean a large position in the Russell 2000 or Russell 2500 is going to be tens of basis points, not hundreds of basis points. And so by taking a two, we’re two and a half percent position, we’re taking a pretty big active bet versus the index. If we’re right, it’s going to make a meaningful impact on our performance to the positive, but if we’re wrong also it can make a meaningful impact. And that’s where correctly assessing the quality of the company and the low expectations of the price are key to protecting capital in the event we’re wrong.

Kyle Helton:

So I came from a firm that equal weights positions on the front end and does this very similarly. Do you get pushback from institutional clients on position weighting being equal weight? Is there a preference to conviction-weighted portfolios?

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

I wouldn’t say there’s a preference. There’s just a need to understand the thinking behind it. And some allocators might be more quantitative oriented and so therefore they want position sizing to be optimized and it’s just hard for them to fathom that your 50th name is as high conviction as your first, your top 10 names are. But I think to Andy’s point, the fact that we run a more focused portfolio provides just a natural gate, if you will, of names coming in and out, and that it also prevents the potential for just maybe some half-baked ideas to come into the portfolio. You want these names vetted, researched, underwritten, and then assuming that it meets our criteria, you want to buy it to the extent they’re can have impact. But if it doesn’t work out, as Colin pointed out, it won’t torpedo your year if you will. If it’s a 2% position, it goes down 25%. It’s 50 basis points. Imagine if it was a 5% position.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, I think this idea of conviction weighting, it goes back to this classic view of your stock picking active equity portfolio manager, these star managers who thought Amazon was the greatest thing, and Bill Miller, whoever, that’s where I think it comes from that. And I’ve tried to look for academic research on this, and from what I can tell, 60 to 70% of performance ultimately comes from picking the right stocks. By that I mean having the right business and you can add additional performance by conviction weighting them, but it’s from our experience internally, we’ve measured the numbers…

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Well, and this view works for us too. Imagine if you’re a large cap growth manager and Apple’s 10% of your index and you have to decide if you want to make a bullish call on Apple. That’s a scary thought. I mean, you’re owning it at 12, 13, 15% to reflect that active constructive view. So I think this works well for the asset classes in which we participate. So I guess the last question for me is we’re just coming off of earning season now. Obviously it’s been a volatile environment. These earning reports are almost like a 90-day checkup in terms of the business case, is it still tracking according to original thesis or not? Any big picture takeaways thus far in terms of how the companies in the portfolio have been behaving?

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, I think I would just observe consistently slowing trends across a bunch of areas, whether it’s enterprise IT spending across the IT services channel or a Home Depot reported this morning. They talked about lower demand for big ticket discretionary items. None of this should be surprising in the context of how much consumption there was 18 months ago, but it feels to me like continued gradual slowing while being mindful that there’s the headwinds of higher cost of capital and lower liquidity from excess savings from consumers or less liquidity on bank balance sheets still has the potential to cause additional headwinds, even though we’ve slowed a good bit already.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

So how do you reconcile the slowdown within both the economy and then we’re seeing it at individual company levels, but you’ve got these broader market indices like the S&P 500 remaining near all time highs from a valuation perspective?

Portfolio Manager:

Well, if you look at the larger market indices, concentration is an enormous issue in terms of what those indices actually represent. I think in the case of the S&P 500, north of 30 to 40% and potentially even a greater degree of the overall earnings growth and multiple are contained by a small handful of businesses. So I think one has to be far more critical at a micro level in terms of what’s really going on and what the message is than simply looking at an S&P 500 that’s got its own issues in terms of its index composition.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah. And to give other measures of valuation. The S&P equal weights probably more than that 15 to 16 times earnings, which is not super high versus history, not super low, maybe more middle of the range. The Russell 2000 value is 11 times earnings. Granted, 40% of that index is not included in that calculation because the 40% of the index makes no money. If you did include that, those companies, it would probably be up towards the mid-teens. But another thing that Andy mentioned earlier, which probably filters into the general buoyancy evaluations, despite slowing economic data, is this idea that over the last 15 years, there’s always been a put, either fiscal policy or monetary policy has come to the rescue whenever there’s been any stress. And until such time as real stress is allowed to roll through the economy, I think valuations will remain fairly buoyant in general or non-distressed in general because of that learned behavior.

Kyle Helton:

Well, I think this is a logical stopping point. Gentlemen. It’s been a great conversation. I look forward to the next time we can all catch up.

Portfolio Manager:

Always nice to see you, Kyle.

Kevin Fitzpatrick:

Thanks Kyle, appreciate it.

Colin Dunn:

Yeah, thanks for the chat, Kyle.

Kyle Helton:

Thank you to all of our listeners for tuning in. Make sure to subscribe to the show on your preferred podcast platform and stay updated on our latest episodes. To learn more about the Cambiar Small and SMID value strategies and their corresponding mutual puns, please visit cambiar.com. I’m your host, Kyle Helton. Thank you. And until next time, take care.

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